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]cn[5 
]ct[On Metaphysical Analysis




]fo[Metaphysics is largely an a priori business, albeit a business that is sensitive to the findings of the physical sciences. But sometimes what the physical sciences tell us about our own world underdetermines what we should think about the metaphysics of how things actually are, and even how they could be. 
	This chapter has two aims. The first is to defend a particular conception of the methodology of a priori metaphysics by, in part, exemplifying that methodology and revealing its results. The second is to present a new account of holes. These two aims dovetail nicely. We are independently interested in providing a better analysis of the concept <hole> that yields a more plausible metaphysical story about holes. But focusing on holes is also a good way to explore the methodology we endorse: for this is an area of metaphysics that is sufficiently self-contained and narrow in focus that it provides a manageable case study, while at the same time raising interesting and deep issues about the nature of space. Ultimately we defend a new, functionalist, analysis of holes, which, unlike its rivals, neither misidentifies nor renders us implausibly eliminativist about holes under various different metaphysical suppositions about the nature of space. In the process, we set out the complex relations between the intension of “hole,” and its extension at various worlds under different suppositions about the nature of space. In explicating these relations our account exemplifies what we take to be the core methodology in a priori metaphysics. 
What is this methodology? Metaphysics is, we think, in large part a matter of constructing conceptual maps. These maps that tell us what we should say about the referent of some term – in this case “hole” – given different suppositions about the referent of some other term – in this case “space.” Those who are sympathetic to conceptual analysis, or to something like the revival of naturalised conceptual analysis following the publication of Jackson’s “From Metaphysics to Ethics”​[1]​will be familiar with the idea that determining the intension of a term, or the right analysis of a concept, involves equilibrating over what we are disposed to say about the referent of the term under different suppositions about which worlds are actual and counterfactual. 
	But building a conceptual map involves more than just armchair reflection on our semantic dispositions. We want to know what we would say about the referent of, in this case, “hole”, under different suppositions about the nature of space. Some of these suppositions will be ones according to which space is one way, and necessarily so, and other suppositions will be ones according to which space is a different way, and necessarily so, and others will be ones according to which space is one way in some worlds, and another way in other worlds. So many of these suppositions do not reflect any possible way space could be. What the map shows us is the structure of conceptual, not logical, space. Some proper part of the map represents logical space, but often the map does not tell us which part that is. 
Conceptual maps are important precisely because often we do not know which part of the map represents logical space, because often we do not know whether a metaphysical view is logically necessary, impossible, or contingent. Since we know that some part of the map represents logical space, we know that if it turns out that we are located just here on the map, then these are the metaphysical claims to which we will be committed. Sorting out these various conditional claims – if this bit of the map represents the logically possible worlds, then here is how the metaphysics goes – is one of the central roles of a priori metaphysics. Of course, metaphysicians can then go on to debate about which part of the map represents the possible worlds, but, arguably, undertaken a priori in some cases that investigation is more fraught. In addition, conceptual maps capture something important about our concepts – whether one wishes to call it content or not – that possible world semantics leaves out. For there seems to be something perfectly sensible in asking what we should think about the nature of holes if, necessarily, space is substantival, even if we suppose that “space is substantival” expresses a counter-possible. Indeed, we can all more or less agree about what the right account of holes would be if, as we think per impossible, space were that way. This is not to say that talk of such maps commits one to an ontology of impossible worlds, or that it commits one to any sort of inflationary account of hyperintensionality, according to which there is a difference in content between necessarily true propositions, and also, on some stronger accounts, between necessarily false propositions. These would be further commitments. We do not defend any thesis about impossible worlds, or propositional content. We suggest only that metaphysics, in its a priori mode, is essentially involved in creating and exploring these conceptual maps.
How does this idea mesh with the methodological prescriptions due to David Lewis, which have so influenced philosophers (Lewis 1972)? Lewis’s view can be taken as a kind of epistemic conservatism. Start with what we actually believe – the so-called platitudes​[2]​ together with best science (which might be thought of as what ‘we’ believe), and then sort out a coherent theory which preserves as much of this as possible. Our take is nuanced differently in ways that correspond to these two components. There is a gradation of ways in which we might be concerned with coherence. At one end it is purely syntactic. There’s only a contradiction in our views if there is an expression and its formal negation in the deductive closure of the sentences that express our platitudes. At the other it is purely semantic: we take as fixed the contents of all these beliefs, and they require revision if the content of them is inconsistent. But there is plenty in between. One might take the content of the platitudes to determine whether our beliefs are consistent or not, but take it that many of the belief-reporting sentences that we hold true have unsettled content. We may settle on the content of those sentences (or the psychological analogues of sentences) in part in response to various meta-attitudes, including preferring the sentence to be analyzed so as to be true, or as to be false, or to be inconsistent with some other sentences. On our view part of philosophical and metaphysical analysis is spelling out the constraints on how to assign the very content that will determine whether our beliefs are consistent, and the circumstances under which we would justifiably assign one content, and the circumstances under which we would assign another. 
The other half of this is the role played by science, and by non-final metaphysics. Metaphysics is at least sometimes influenced by science, but it’s helpful to know how it would be influenced under different assumptions about what is the case given the fallibility of the sciences. So our maps have a kind of conditional structure. That conditionality also extends to metaphysical claims in different domains. If you are interested in one topic it might well end up, as in the topic of the current paper, to depend on another. What we think about holes may depend on what we think about the metaphysics of space. But we will get nowhere if we have to wait for the one true metaphysics of space. Many accounts of space are empirically equivalent, and even if there are reasons for preferring one they are unlikely to be apodictic. And, for all we are justified in asserting, it might be that all the false views are impossible or even contentlessly incoherent. So we have to be able to say something about what we should believe conditional on many different accounts, some of which may be strictly contentless, or at least impossible. In which case we need an account of the normative connexions between our beliefs which is not really about either what is formally inconsistent, or even more broadly inconsistent in terms of content, but rather in terms of norms of reasoning behind a hyperintensional veil, where we are unsure not only what the content of all of our thoughts and platitudes is, but even whether some of them have intentional content or are even coherent. We’d like to take all this to be an extension of Lewis’s view, but perhaps that’s partly the common philosopher’s desire to have their view turn out to be a lineal descendent of their philosophical hero’s.
We do not pretend that our discussion of different views about the nature of space is exhaustive, for our aim is not the ambitious one of creating a complete conceptual map for the metaphysics of holes. Rather, we hope to both motivate our claim that maps are not only useful, but core components of metaphysics, whilst at the same time giving a flavor for the map in question, which ultimately leads us to a new analysis of “hole.” 

]a[5.2 Some Background on Holes

]fo[There are three different kinds of accounts of the nature of holes. The first, deflationary, sort of accounts, identify holes with hole-linings, or more generally with surfaces or parts of paradigm material objects. The Lewises’ (Lewis & Lewis 1970) account is the best exemplar of this sort. The Lewises identify holes with what we would normally think of as “hole-linings,” that is, with a certain part of the surface of the material object in which we would tend to say there is a hole and which we would tend to say “lines” the hole. 
The advantage of the Lewisian account is that we identify holes with perfectly respectable ontological entities: surfaces of material objects. Indeed, the Lewisian account can be seen as motivated by the desire to avoid identifying holes with mysterious absences. The account succeeds in rendering holes perfectly ontologically respectable, however, at the cost of failing to do justice to our intuitions about the location and dimension of holes. 
It was in the shadow of this failure that Casati and Varzi (1994) developed their account of holes, an account that was sensitive to intuitions about holes. On their account, holes turn out to be located roughly where we think they are. The trade-off for preserving this folk conception was that they held that holes were a fundamentally different kind of entity to material objects. On their view, holes are a particular kind of immaterial being: immaterial beings with particular topological and relational properties. Call this the immaterial beings view. To make sense of this notion, Varzi and Casati embrace the idea that we should be realists about space. On their view space can be qualified – it can have certain intrinsic properties – or it can be bare or unqualified – lacking such intrinsic properties. Then, they claim, material objects are composed of qualified space. Immaterial objects are composed of unqualified space. Once we add unqualified space into our ontology, we have something ontologically respectable with which to identify holes. Moreover, since even unqualified space has dispositional properties – such as being able to be qualified – we can explain how immaterial beings, and holes specifically, can have certain dispositional properties. 
The third account, due to one of the present authors (Miller 2007) recommends that we identify holes with material beings of a certain non-paradigmatic sort. Call this the material beings view. On this view, holes exist where Varzi and Casati and the folk think they do, but they are not immaterial beings. Unlike Varzi and Casati’s account, which identifies material beings with regions of qualified space, the material beings view remains silent about the underlying nature of material beings. It says only that O is a material being iff O is composed of matter. This leaves open the nature of the composition relation, and also leaves it open that matter might have a different nature in different worlds, for instance, that in some but not other worlds it might be qualified substantival space. 
This view is motivated by what physicists tell us about our world. Namely, they tell us that there are no regions of space across which the fields have a uniform value of zero: there are energy fluctuations across all such regions. So there are no regions of unqualified space, in Varzi and Casati’s sense. Or, to put it more simply, there are no empty regions of space. But then if Varzi and Casati are right that holes are composed of unqualified space, it turns out that actually there are no holes. Since presumably we do not want to be hole eliminativists, we have reason to think that holes are not immaterial beings. We also have reason to think that holes are not hole-linings. If a region is occupied just in case that region is composed of qualified space, then every region of our world is occupied. Then plausibly we can hold that the region where we are tempted to say there exists a hole is occupied by a perfectly respectable, albeit non-paradigmatic, material being.​[3]​ And that material being is a better candidate with which to identify the hole than is a hole-lining. Hence should conclude, according to Miller, that holes are non-paradigmatic material beings. 

]b[5.2.1 The Next Move

]fo[At this point in the debate Varzi and Casati had a response to the claim that holes should be identified with non-paradigmatic material beings. Even if, they said, in our world space is always qualified, this merely shows that it is contingent that in our world every hole is occupied.​[4]​ It does not mean that we should identify holes with occupants, and hence with material beings. After all, our world could have been such that there are holes that are not occupied by anything.​[5]​ So holes ought not to be identified with what merely contingently occupies them.
Put very roughly, the debate between the three views seems to hang first on whether we think that worlds are composed of space and, if so, whether that space is such that if it is qualified, it makes sense to suppose that we could remove its qualities and be left with unqualified space and hence with immaterial beings with which to identify holes. To resolve these issues, we need to consider some accounts of the nature of space. In what follows we tease out the details of some such accounts by starting with a well-worn distinction between two broad conceptions of the nature of space: substantivalism and relationism. In the following section we consider what implications each of these accounts has for an account of holes. We will not argue for any particular account of space. Rather, to develop a conceptual map we intend to explore how the different analyses of <hole> fare under different suppositions about the nature of space.

]a[5.3 The Nature of Space

]fo[Broadly construed, substantivalism is the view that space is a real thing or substance. Substantivalism is typically contrasted with relationism, the view that space is not a real thing or substance, but rather, that there exist only concrete objects and events​[6]​ and primitive spatial and temporal relations that hold between them. According to relationists, spatial relations hold directly between objects, they do not hold, as the substantivalist suggests, in virtue of objects being related to a third thing – space. 
	Relationism comes in two general versions, an actualist and a modal version. Actualist relationism holds that there exist only actual objects and the actual spatial relations that hold between them.​[7]​ Modal relationism holds that there exist actual objects, and the actual and possible spatial relations that hold between them.​[8]​ That is, modal relationism appeals to possible spatial relations, relations that would hold were there certain objects and events at certain locations. 
For the actualist, literally nothing – including locations – exists between objects: there is merely the holding of non-zero distance relations between those objects. To talk of a location at which no object exists is, at best, to claim that had there existed an object with certain spatio-temporal relations to other objects, there would have existed such a location. We can define actualist relationism as follows:

]ex[ACT REL: Actualist Relationism is true at a world w iff
]exfo[(a) all spatial properties and relations in w are properties of, or relations between, objects in w.
]exfo[Some take the following to be entailed by (a). If it isn’t, then it is a separate clause:
]exfo[(b) there exists a location L in w iff there exists some object at L.

]fo[The modal relationist, on the other hand, can accommodate the notion of unoccupied locations. In a sense, the modal relationist constructs locations out of, or perhaps better, reduces locations to, the existence of actual and possible objects.​[9]​ It is not clear quite how this is to work. Though Butterfield (1984) rejects modal relationism, he suggests that the relationist identify unoccupied locations​[10]​ with sets of objects or events that occupy that location in some world or other. Since there are very many possible objects or events that could have occupied a particular location, we cannot identify a location with any particular possible object. So what does it mean to say that the relevant possible objects occupy the same location in other possible worlds? Butterfield defines the equivalence relation as “is according to the substantivalist at the same location as.” Even setting aside Butterfield’s worries about this proposal – namely for one, that an object cannot exist at two different locations in distinct worlds on pain of identifying distinct locations (Butterfield 1984, 106) – it hardly seems ideal to pick out the same locations in different worlds by deferring to what the substantivalist would say about those worlds. That point seems especially pressing if one thinks that relationism is necessarily true. For then substantivalism is incoherent, and defining the relevant set of possible objects in terms of substantivalist theory would be like building a house on sand, at least if we take Butterfield to be defending a kind of realism about locations. Of course he might better be read as a kind of fictionalist about the same location relation, in which case it is less problematic if the substantivalist fiction is incoherent. We do not take it as our task to adjudicate this matter here, so we will simply assume that some sense can be made of modal relationism. We will define modal relationism as follows:

]ex[MOD REL: Modal Relationism is true at a world w iff:
]exfo[(a) all spatial properties and relations in w are properties of, or relations between, objects in w or between objects in w and objects that are metaphysically​[11]​ possible at w.
]exfo[Some take the following to be entailed by (a). If not it should be a separate clause:
]exfo[ (b) there exists a location L in w iff there exists some object at L or it is metaphysically possible at w that there is an object at L.

]fo[In contrast to the relationist, who only posits relations between objects, the substantivalist posits relations between objects and space. Substantivalism is often expressed as the view that space has certain intrinsic properties as do the objects located within space, and the intrinsic properties of the former are independent of the intrinsic properties of the latter. Space exists independently of the objects that are located within it, and it is in virtue of being related to a particular region of space that an object is located where it is. 
Unsurprisingly, metaphysical accounts of space, both actual and counterfactual, have been structured by features of different accounts of the nature of actual space–time as revealed to us by the physical sciences. Theories about the geometry of our world, from Newtonian through neo-Newtonian to general relativistic, begin by positing a set of points and then adding in further structure. They add in a topological structure, which yields a manifold, and then they add in geometric structure, where the geometric structure is given by a metric that specifies the distances between the points.
Our current best science appeals to the theory of general relativity. Models of that theory (which represent physically possible worlds for that theory) are defined in terms of a triple of M, g and T. M represents the manifold, in this case a four-dimensional manifold of continuum many points. The metric, represented by g, defines the metric relations among the points, and in this case includes the gravitational field, and T, the stress–energy tensor, represents the distribution of matter and energy. Rival versions of substantivalism emerge when substantivalists identify actual space–time with different combinations of M, g and T. Once this identification is in place, it is generally assumed that the underlying form, though not the specific features, of all possible spaces will mirror that of actual space.
So, for instance, some, like Earman and Norton (1987), identify actual substantival space–time (if there is any) with M, a view often known as manifold substantivalism. Actual space–time is identified with a particular topological arrangement of points – a four-dimensional manifold – and from there it is plausible to suppose that any possible substantival space will be identified with a manifold, though in other worlds that manifold might be composed of numerically distinct points from the actual points, and might have a different topology to the one that actual space–time has. We can define manifold substantivalism as follows:

]ex[MS: Manifold substantivalism is true at a world w iff (a) there is substantival space in w and (ii) that space is identical to a collection of continuous points with a particular topology – a manifold M.​[12]​
 
]fo[Another way to think of manifold substantivalism is as a kind of topological essentialism. We identify the space in some world with a collection of points, and we ask ourselves under what conditions we would have numerically the same space. The answer is that it is essential to those points that they have the topological relations that they do, that is, it is essential to being the same point in some world, that that point exist in topologically the same manifold. Hence a different topology yields a numerically different space. 
Other substantivalists identify actual space–time with M plus g: the four-dimensional manifold plus the GTR metric. Then they identify substantival space more generally with a particular collection of points with a particular topology and metric. Defended by Hoefer (1996) and Maudlin (1988), this view is sometimes known as metric field substantivalism. The most common version of metric field substantivalism does more than simply identify space with the manifold and the metric, since such an identification would allow that we can have the very same space even if we distribute the points on the manifold differently, but in a way that preserves the metric.​[13]​ The more common version holds that it is an essential property of each point that it has the relational properties it does, and hence it is an essential property of space that each point is located where it is in relation to other points.​[14]​ By metric field substantivalism we will mean this stronger view that:

]ex[MFS: Metric field substantivalism is true in any world w iff (a) there is substantival space in w and (b) that space is identical to a collection of continuous points with a particular topology M and metric g, such that for each point the relational properties of that point conferred by the metric are essential properties of that point.

]fo[Another way to think about metric field substantivalism is as a kind of metric essentialism. We identify the space in some world with a collection of points, and ask ourselves under what conditions we have numerically the same space. The answer is that it is essential to those points that they have the topological and metric relations that they do. Not only is it essential to any point that it exist in topologically and metrically the same manifold, but also that it have the particular metric relations to other points that it has – so even a manifold with the same topology and metric but with the points moved around would be numerically different space. 
The final version of substantivalism that we will consider is tensor field substantivalism. This is the view that actual space–time should be identified with M, g and T: with a set of continuous points on a manifold with a particular topology and metric, and a particular distribution of matter and field properties. More generally:

]ex[TFS: Tensor field substantivalism is true in any world w iff (a) there is substantival space in w and (b) that space is identical to a collection of continuous points with a particular topology, M, and metric g, such that each of those points has all of its properties essentially.

]fo[According to tensor field substantivalism, there is in some sense no distinction between space, the container, and the objects that exist within that container, insofar as there is nothing more to either the objects or the space than the collection of points and their properties.​[15]​ If tensor field substantivalism is true, then there are no qualitatively distinct worlds at which the same space exists: for to change the distribution of matter in any way is for there to be numerically distinct space.
The question now arises as to what modality one should attach to these views. One might be a necessitarian, holding that whichever account of the nature of space holds, it holds of necessity. Or one might be a contingentist, holding that at some worlds one account is true, and at other worlds other accounts are true. There are different versions of contingentism. Not all contingentists might think that every account of the nature of space we’ve just described reflects a possible way space could be. What we’ll call “strong” contingentism accepts just that.
Our methodology is to evaluate each of the analyses in the light of each of the different suppositions about the nature of space that we have so far outlined. In a sense then, we are evaluating the analyses as if strong contingentism is true. This is not because we think it the most plausible view. Indeed, we think it much more likely that if substantivalism is true at any worlds, then the very same kind of substantivalism – manifold, metric field, or tensor field – is true at all those worlds. But we are interested in evaluating different analyses of the concept <hole>. If an analysis of <hole> is sensitive to the right account of space, then we want to evaluate it under the broadest range of suppositions about space. 
One might, however, object. If space is one way and necessarily so, then as long as space is a way that makes one’s preferred analysis correctly identify holes across the possible worlds, then the fact that some other account of space would have resulted in one’s account misidentifying or eliminating holes can be of no significance. That one’s analysis fails in certain impossible worlds is inconsequential. 
But the metaphysics of different accounts of space is controversial. Even if one is a necessitarian about one’s preferred account, one should surely given reasonable credence to being mistaken about either the modality or the details of the correct account. Yet once one gives credence to alternative accounts being true, one should be worried if one’s account of what it is to be a hole would eliminate or misidentify holes if an alternative account turned out to be true. 
It is important to pull apart the analysis of our concept <hole>, that is, the analysis that yields the intension of “hole,” from the extension of that term at different worlds given one’s views about the nature of space. The former is the result of a priori analysis, the latter give us the metaphysics of holes when combined with that analysis. 
Given that one believes that a particular account of space is necessarily false, one should expect one’s views about the extension of holes to be false in worlds where that account turns out, pace your expectations, to be true. But one should not expect that in such worlds one’s analysis of what it is to be a hole will result in the misidentification or elimination of holes in that world. For that, surely, is to say that one has the wrong analysis. 
In what follows we consider how each of the analyses fares given different suppositions about the nature of space. For simplicity, we express this in terms of the traditional locution of considering some world w at which that supposition is true. Since hard contingentists think all of these suppositions are ways a world could be, they will read this locution in the usual manner, as considering some possible world w. Necessitarians, however, should read the locution in terms of considering some epistemically possible world w. For necessitarians are considering what they should say about holes in some world if it turned out, contrary to the necessitarian expectation, that some other account of the nature of space is true (contingently or necessarily) and hence the world in question is possible. 
By considering all of these suppositions we begin to create a conceptual map that tells us important things about our concept <hole>, and furnishes us with all that can be said, a priori, about holes. 

]a[5.4 Space, Worlds, and Holes

]fo[Let us recall briefly the three analyses of holes that are on offer. The first, Lewisian, account is that holes are material hole-linings. The second, immaterial beings, account, due to Varzi and Casati, is that holes are immaterial beings with a certain topology and relational properties. The third, material beings, account, due to Miller, is that holes are non-paradigmatic material beings with a certain topology and relational properties. 
As we will see, the problem with all three analyses is that for each there are worlds at which that account seems wrongly to locate the holes, or worse, to implausibly render hole eliminativism true at that world. 

]b[5.4.1 Relationism and Holes

]fo[Let us begin by considering relationist accounts of space. Suppose actualist relationism is true in w1. Further, suppose that w1 is what we will call a non-plenum world, where, intuitively, plenum worlds are worlds in which every region is occupied by some sort of matter or energy field, and non-plenum worlds are worlds in which there are unoccupied regions. Substantivalists can straightforwardly define plenum and non-plenum worlds in terms of the occupation of regions. But in order to be neutral between whether a world is one in which relationism or substantivalism is true, we define non-plenum worlds as follows:

]ex[Non-plenum: w is a non-plenum world iff there exists an unsurrounded object where an unsurrounded object O is one such that there is a point on its border, P and a direction D, such that the closest object not identical to O in that direction is a non-zero distance away.

]fo[Intuitively, in non-plenum worlds the location at which we would pre-theoretically say there is a hole might be wholly occupied by matter, or it might be partially occupied by matter, or it might be entirely unoccupied by matter. We will primarily be interested in occupied and unoccupied holes. Occupied holes are ones that, according to our pre-theoretic judgements as to their location, are completely occupied by matter. Unoccupied holes are ones that, according to our pre-theoretic judgements as to their location, are completely unoccupied by matter. Talk of unoccupied holes is straightforward for the substantivalist, but not for the relationist. Below we give a feel for how a definition consistent with relationism might proceed, before returning to consider this definition and the idea of an unoccupied hole in the context of the ensuing discussion in terms of actualist relationism.

]ex[Unoccupied hole: an unoccupied hole H in an object O is one such that on every point P on the surface of O which is on the boundary of H, in every direction from P the nearest object (if there is one) in that direction that is within the hole opening is a part of O. 
]exfo[Hole opening = def that part of what, intuitively, we would describe as the hole boundary (if any), which is not part of the object boundary.

]fo[Unlike plenum worlds, non-plenum worlds offer the possibility of unoccupied holes. So, let us consider w1, which, recall, is a non-plenum actualist relationist world. Consider what seems to be an unoccupied hole, H1 in object O1 in w1. That hole cannot be either an immaterial being or a non-paradigmatic material being. There is no space in w1, and hence there is no immaterial being in the relevant location. Nor, by definition, is there any matter in the location where we think the hole exists, and hence there is no material being at the location. So, in actualist relationist worlds, both the immaterial and the material beings views render us eliminativists about holes like H1. In w1, the right account of holes seems to be the Lewises’, which identifies the hole “in” O1 with a part of O1’s surface – the hole-lining. 
This makes talk of an “unoccupied hole” a bit misleading, since it is not that there is a hole with certain dimensions which is unoccupied by matter: the hole turns out just to be the surface of the object that has the hole. But that is what we should expect. If actualist relationism is true, then even defining an “unoccupied hole” is problematic. We appealed to the idea of a hole opening. But that requires that we are able to talk of the parts of a hole boundary that are not parts of the object boundary, and to do that it looks like we need to be able to talk about unoccupied points – the points that are on the hole opening, but where no matter is located. And that is precisely what actualist relationism will not allow us to do. For there are no such points, and no such locations. Thus we cannot define a hole-opening and hence cannot define an unoccupied hole. That is not surprising, we cannot even talk about the location at which we are tempted to say there exists a hole, because there is no such location. Strictly speaking we should say that, in worlds like w1, there are no unoccupied holes, though there are holes in unsurrounded objects on the parts of the surface of those objects that do not border any other objects. However, for ease of exposition we will continue to talk of unoccupied holes in actualist relationist non-plenum worlds. The point is that, on pain of eliminativism, such holes must be identified with surfaces of material objects just as the Lewises’ suggest.
Now consider w1*, which is like w1 in being a world where actualist relationism is true, except that w1* is a plenum world:

]ex[Plenum: w is a plenum world iff there exist no unsurrounded objects in w.

Plausibly, ours is a plenum world. It is a world where, for instance, holes are filled with gas, or water or energy fluctuations, or some-such. In w1* if there are any holes, they are occupied holes, where H is an occupied hole iff there exists matter in exactly the location where, intuitively, we would say there exists a hole. (Of course, if one is an actualist relationist then there is only such a location if there is matter there.)
In w1* both the Lewisian analysis and the immaterial beings analysis are unsatisfactory. The former identifies the holes in w1* with parts of the surfaces of the paradigm objects that “house” the hole. But that seems wrong, since there is a better candidate in w1* to be identified as the hole, namely the entity that occupies just the location and has just the dimensions that we would attribute to the hole: a non-paradigm material being (or object). The immaterial beings analysis offers an even worse outcome: it renders us eliminativist about holes in w1*, since there are no immaterial beings in w1*. Indeed, since for Varzi and Casati material beings are composed of qualified space, their view has the much worse implication that there are no material beings in w1*, or indeed, in any relationist world. The virtue of the material beings view is that it does not identify material beings with regions of qualified space, it can still maintain that there is a material being in the region in question – just not a material being composed of qualified space. Thus in worlds like w1* – actualist relationist plenum worlds – the material beings analysis correctly identifies the holes where the other two analyses fail. 
Consider now modal relationism. As we see it, whether a world is an actualist relationist world or a modal relationist world will have no effect on which analysis successfully identifies the holes at that world. This is clearly true in plenum worlds. Since all possible relations are actual relations, the two views collapse into one another in plenum worlds. In non-plenum worlds matters are less clear. Consider a world w2 that has the same distribution of matter as w1 (and is thus a non-plenum world), but where modal relationism is true. In w2 we can sensibly talk about the unoccupied region surrounding O2 (the counterpart of O1 in w1). So it is much more straightforward to talk about an unoccupied hole in O2. That might lead us to suspect that a non-Lewisian analysis is feasible in such a world. 
The difficulty is that there is nothing in the unoccupied region with which to identify the hole: either material or immaterial. One option would be to identify the hole with a true void: an unoccupied region in a world without substantival space. We are prepared to follow the modal relationist in holding that we can talk about unoccupied regions without being committed to the existence of substantival space, and hence that, in some minimal sense, perhaps, there exist true voids. But the sense in which such voids exist is not one in which there exists some substantial nothingness with which one can identify a substantial absence – namely a hole. Our claim is not that if there were true voids, then we should identify holes with those voids, but there are no voids (and necessarily so) thus we cannot so identify. For that would be to adjudicate the question of whether there are possible worlds with voids, a task we explicitly eschew. Rather, we think that even if modal relationism is true at some worlds, those are not worlds with true voids in the sense that would be required for there to exist something with which to identify a hole. But should the reader disagree, we leave it as an exercise for him/her to amend our conditional analyses in the light of the view that in modal relationist worlds, holes are to be identified with true voids. This will make the analyses more complex, but nothing that we say otherwise will be changed. On the assumption that we are correct, however, we will simply talk about “relationism,” where this is understood to mean either actualist or modal relationism.
Then the Lewisian analysis is vindicated in any relationist world with unoccupied holes, and the material beings view is vindicated in any relationist world with occupied worlds. 

]b[5.4.2 Substantivalism and Holes

]fo[Varzi and Casati are clear that their view presupposes that substantivalism is true. Their view is that we should identify holes with immaterial beings that are regions of unqualified space. But what, in the light of the different sorts of substantivalism that we have outlined, does that amount to and how does their account fare in comparison with the material beings view? We begin by considering tensor field substantivalism. This is probably the least common kind of substantivalism, but it is worth considering because of the light it sheds on the debate between the immaterial beings and the material beings analysis of <hole>. First though, we should note that most of the discussion of different kinds of substantivalism focuses on the different implications for the material beings and the immaterial beings analyses. For obvious reasons. We think it pretty plain that if a world has substantival space of some kind or other, then both the material and the immaterial beings analyses are preferable to the Lewisian analysis. If there is some entity in the region in which we tend to say there is a hole, then that entity is a better deserver of “hole” than is a hole-lining. Consideration of different kinds of substantivalism is thus primarily directed at discerning how the other two analyses fare under different suppositions about the nature of substantival space. 

]c[5.4.2.1 Tensor Field Substantivalism

]fo[Suppose tensor field substantivalism is true in w3, and that w3 is a plenum world. Suppose we identify the holes in w3 with regions of substantival space as Varzi and Casati demand. Since all regions of space in w3 are decidedly qualified, in Varzi and Casati’s sense, have we identified the holes with material or immaterial beings? 
In the light of the possibility of plenum worlds, Varzi and Casati shift their view of immaterial being from the claim that immaterial beings are regions of unqualified substantival space, to the view that immaterial beings are regions of substantival space, such that if the region in question region is qualified, then it is possible to remove the qualities. More carefully, the view seems to be that x is an immaterial being iff x is identical to a region of substantival space, and if that region of space has intrinsic qualities, then we could remove all of the qualities from that region of space and x would still exist in that region. Holes are immaterial beings, they maintain, because in a plenum world we could remove all of the matter and still have the same hole in the same region. Their newer understanding of immaterial beings then suggests they should say that x is a material being iff x is identical to a region of qualified space, such that we could not remove all of the matter from that region of space and x would still exist in that region. 
	Recall that tensor field substantivalism is the view that each space–time point has all of its properties essentially. This entails that it is essential to space in w3 that it have the matter field it does and hence entails that there is no world that has the same space as w3, but where the matter has been removed from the regions occupied by the holes in w3. It is not, therefore, merely contingent that the holes in w3 are occupied. Rather, given the definitions just considered, it turns out that all regions of tensor field substantival space are identical to material, not immaterial beings. There are no immaterial beings in w3, Hence the analysis makes us eliminativists about holes in w3. 
There are some options open here. We could think of the immaterial beings view as simply telling us that holes should be identified with regions of substantival space. It could then be a further posit of the view that these regions will turn out to be immaterial beings, on the assumption that substantival space is a certain way, namely a way that renders it possible to have numerically the same space unoccupied by matter. That further posit could turn out to be false, without making us eliminativists about holes. It would simply yield the result that we identify holes with a material rather than an immaterial being. That is not, we think, what Varzi and Casati intended, but considering the view will help clarify some important issues that will arise later.
Suppose we do identify the holes in w3 with regions of substantival space, setting aside the problem that such regions are not immaterial beings. Then there are other problems. Perfectly ordinary counterfactual conditionals about holes come out false. Claims such as “if I had dug deeper, this hole would have been larger” are false, since the closest world where I dig deeper has a different matter field from w3, and hence is a world with numerically distinct space and hence numerically distinct holes. 
What then, of the material beings view? The material beings view will certainly not want to identify material beings with regions of qualified space. After all, this would render it eliminativist about material beings in any worlds that lack substantival space. She might want to say that in worlds with substantival space, material beings are constituted by, or contingently identical to, regions of qualified substantival space for they are composed of matter, and in such worlds matter is constituted by, or contingently identical to, regions of qualified space. Then in worlds without substantival space the view might hold that material beings are composed of matter by being constituted by, or contingently identical to, a mereological fusion of matter particles, or to the values across the matter field. For simplicity and parity with Varzi and Casati’s view, however, we will assume that, in worlds with substantival space, material beings are composed of regions of qualified substantival space. In particular, we assume that in worlds with substantival space, material beings are contingently identical to regions of qualified space, though everything we say can be translated, mutatis mutandis, into talk about constitution. Further, for clarity we will use the phrases “straightforward identity” or “straightforwardly identify” to refer to the standard, non-contingent sort of identity. More specifically, we will say that x is a material being just in case:
]ex[X is a material being iff either (i) x exists in a world where there is substantival space and x is contingently identical to a region of qualified substantival space such that we could not remove all of the qualities from that region and x would still exist in that region, or (ii) x exists in a world where relationism is true and x is contingently identical to a fusion of matter particles or to a region of a matter field.

]fo[Then the idea is that terms like “Fred” that refer to an object and “Molly” that refer to a particular region of space, pick out the very same entity in one world – w3 – but pick out distinct entities in other worlds, because Fred and Molly have different counterparts in other possible worlds. There are object-counterparts of Fred’s that are not space–time region counterparts of Molly’s, and vice versa. Hence material beings can be contingently identical to different regions of space in different worlds. 
On this view of material beings, the material beings account and the “amended” immaterial beings account both identify holes in w3 with material beings, but they differ in what they will say about the counterfactuals regarding those holes. For the material beings view can allow that the very same hole exists in qualitatively distinct worlds, despite the fact that the same region of space does not. Counterfactuals such as “had I dug deeper, the hole would have been larger” will come out true: in the closest world where I dig deeper the material being that is the hole exists and is larger. It is just that that material being is contingently identical to a numerically distinct region of space from the one with which it is contingently identical in w3. 
So in plenum worlds in which tensor field substantivalism is true, the material beings analysis is clearly superior to any of the alternatives. It is superior to the Lewisian analysis, since it locates the holes in a more plausible location, giving them genuine dimensions and various other dispositional properties. It is also superior to the straight immaterial beings view, since that view results in hole-elimination. And it is superior to the amended immaterial beings view, which not only, ironically, turns out to identify holes with material beings, but which renders false ordinary counterfactuals about holes. 
On the other hand, the material beings view fares badly in non-plenum worlds in which tensor field substantivalism is true. For in such worlds there may be unoccupied holes, and hence holes that cannot be identified with any material being. In such worlds the material being analysis will render us eliminativists about unoccupied holes. In non-plenum worlds the immaterial beings view allows us correctly to identify the holes, and to identify them as immaterial beings. But so long as it straightforwardly identifies the holes with regions of, in this case, unqualified substantival space, it still faces the problem that perfectly ordinary counterfactuals about those holes will come out false.

]c[5.4.2.2 Counterfactuals and the Error Theory

]fo[By now we should be getting a feel for the general form of the problem facing our three analyses. We begin by supposing, for each different account of the nature of space, that it is at least epistemically possible that there is a world is one in which that account is true. Then we discover, for each analysis of “hole,” that that analysis misidentifies or eliminates the holes in some (at least) epistemically possible world. That gives us reason to suppose that the analyses are mistaken. In general, this is the problem that the analyses implausibly leave us open to the error theory being true of holes should certain suppositions about space turn out to be possible. Call this the error theory problem. 
We have just seen, however, that even abstracting away from the error theory problem leaves some problems for our analyses, and these problems are generated without any appeal to what some might maintain are strictly counter-possibles. This is a set of problems that arise when we try to evaluate counterfactual conditionals about holes: call it the counterfactual conditional problem. These two broad problems appear to be quite distinct, but furnishing a solution to the latter will help with the former. Let us see how. 
We suggested that the right account of material beings would not straightforwardly identify them with qualified regions of substantival space. Rather, material beings should be thought of as contingently identical to such regions. 
This suggests we might adopt a similar treatment for holes. So in a world w in which tensor field substantivalism is true, any hole is contingently identical to a region of substantival space, namely the space that surrounds the hole-lining and has certain dimensions and topological properties. Let us call the totality of properties relevant to determining the location of a hole the H-properties. These properties include the properties of the hole-lining, the topology of the hole, and other relational properties about the location of objects in the world. The idea is that we track the counterparts of any hole in w in terms of these H-properties. In the relevant counterfactual worlds we locate the counterpart of the object in w that “houses” the hole, and in doing so we locate the hole-lining in that world. From there we can determine the dimensions and topology of the hole, and hence determine with which region of space in that world, the hole is contingently identical. Once we appeal to an account such as this the problem of counterfactual conditionals vanishes, since holes have counterparts in the relevantly closest worlds even though those worlds have numerically distinct space. In general, we suggest the following:

]ex[Analysis 1: In any world w in which there is tensor field substantival space, a hole H is contingently identical to the region of substantival space that has the H-properties.

]fo[We could think of this as a functionalist analysis of <hole>. The functional role is captured by the H-properties. What realizes the H-properties varies between worlds depending on which region of tensor field substantival space is playing the role. Hence we can have the same hole being realized by different regions of space.​[16]​ Since in any world in which tensor field substantivalism is true the holes are contingently identical to regions of tensor field substantival space, it follows that occupied holes are contingently identical to material beings, and unoccupied holes are contingently identical to immaterial beings. So what is right about both the material beings and the immaterial beings views is not the analysis they offer, but, rather, that there are worlds in which each correctly identifies what it is that realizes the hole. Some holes are material beings, and other holes are immaterial beings. But it is not part of an analysis of <hole> that they should be straightforwardly identified with either. 
 	Bearing in mind this simple analysis, we can now consider some other versions of substantivalism, beginning with metric field substantivalism.

]c[5.4.2.3 Metric Field Substantivalism

]fo[Suppose that w4 is a plenum world in which metric field substantivalism is true, and that it is a world in which general relativity holds. Now we follow Varzi and Casati in straightforwardly identifying holes in w4 with regions of metric field substantival space. Given metric field substantivalism, there is a world, w4*, that has the same space–(time) as w4 (in virtue of having the same metric and points) and which has almost the same distribution of matter except that the region at which there is a hole in w4 is, in w4*, unoccupied. w4* is a non-plenum world that has an unoccupied hole at the same region where there is an occupied hole in w4. Since w4* has the same space as w4, the region of space where the hole exists in w4 could have been unoccupied. So it looks as though, if metric field substantivalism is true, then Varzi and Casati’s account succeeds, for, even in plenum worlds, there is an immaterial being with which to identify the hole – namely, the region of substantival space from which we could remove all of the matter. It is just that the hole in w4 is, contingently, occupied by some material being.
	But immediately a problem arises: w4* is not close to w4. It has very different laws of nature. We know that given general relativity, g, the metric, and T, the stress–tensor field, are interdependent. For g includes the gravitational field, and hence has implications for the distribution of matter and energy. Consistent with the general theory of relativity, we cannot remove or rearrange the matter and have the same metric: different matter field, different metric. Any world that is nomologically accessible from w4 (that is, any world that is nomologically possible if w4 is a possible world) where there is matter absent from just the region where in w4 there is a hole, is a world with a different metric and hence a world with numerically distinct space–time. 
Thus if we straightforwardly identify a hole in w4 with a region of substantival space, a whole range of plausible counterfactual conditionals come out false. A conditional Varzi and Casati want to endorse, such as “if I removed the matter from this region where there is a hole, there would remain the very same hole, now unoccupied” will be false. For the closest world in which to evaluate that conditional – and hence a world with the same laws of nature – is one in which the matter is rearranged, and hence the metric is changed and the space–time is numerically distinct to space–time in w4. So in that world the hole does not exist. Similarly, perfectly run of the mill counterfactuals such as “if I had dug more dirt out, this hole would have been larger” also turn out to be false for the same reasons. 
The material beings analysis fares no better. In plenum worlds it outperforms the immaterial beings analysis. It gets right counterfactuals such as “if I had dug more dirt out, this hole would have been larger.” Since the closest world will be a plenum world (given that the w4 is) and will have the same laws of nature, there will be a material being in that world with which we can identify the hole – a material being that in the relevant world is indeed larger. But, once again, in non-plenum worlds with unoccupied holes the material beings analysis falls prey to the error theory problem. Worse still, given metric field substantivalism, even if w4 is a plenum world, there are nomologically accessible worlds with unoccupied regions (albeit worlds with numerically distinct space–time), and hence potentially with unoccupied holes. Yet in these quite close worlds the material beings analysis still forces us to be eliminativists about unoccupied holes. 
Once again, then, even if we only focus on worlds where metric field substantivalism is true, the immaterial beings view faces the counterfactual conditional problem, while even amongst these limited worlds the material beings view faces the error theory problem. 
 Each could simply bite the bullet. Varzi and Casati could say so much the worse for our intuitions. If holes really are made of space, and if it turns out to be a surprising fact that our laws of nature are such that matter and energy are interdependent with the metric, then we should not be surprised to find that there are counterintuitive facts about the identity of holes across worlds. Likewise, the material beings proponent could say that we should be eliminativists about holes in worlds where there are unoccupied regions. But neither of these strategies is very attractive. 
Instead, we suggest adopting the same strategy we proffered if it should turn out that tensor field substantivalism is true. Namely, if metric field substantivalism is true at a world then we contingently identify holes with regions of metric field substantival space. 

]ex[Analysis 2: In any world w in which there is metric field substantival space, a hole H is contingently identical to the region of substantival space that has the H-properties.





]fo[Finally we turn to manifold substantivalism. On this view, substantival space is a collection of continuous points with a particular topology. Since topology underdetermines geometry, consistent with general relativity different worlds with the same topology can have a different distribution of matter and energy. So suppose w5 is a plenum world in which manifold substantivalism is true, and suppose we follow Varzi and Casati in straightforwardly identifying holes with regions of manifold substantival space. Then the immaterial beings view fares rather better than on other suppositions about the nature of space. For there is a nomologically accessible world to w5 that preserves the same topology and hence has numerically the same space as w5, but which has a different distribution of matter. So, for any hole in w5 that is identified with a region of qualified space, there is a nomologically accessible world with the very same space, but where that region is unoccupied by matter. It might even be that this is the closest world, so long as very minimal differences in the distribution of matter are consistent both with that region being unoccupied and with preserving the same topology. We are not entirely convinced that such a world will be the closest, but let us give the immaterial beings view the benefit of the doubt and suppose it is. Then the counterfactual “had this region not been occupied by matter there would still have been a hole here” comes out true, and we have identified the holes in the plenum world with immaterial, not material beings. Moreover, every counterfactual such as “if I had dug deeper, this hole would have been larger” also comes out true. Likewise, the view correctly identifies the unoccupied holes in non-plenum worlds, and allows that the appropriate counterfactuals about those holes come out true.




]fo[Here then, is the dialectic. What holes are depends crucially on controversial details about the metaphysics of space. The problem for the three accounts of holes is that each builds some of this metaphysics into the very analysis of the concept <hole>. Then, when we consider each analysis in a world where the relevant metaphysics does not hold, it turns out that we are mistaken in our identification of the holes in that world. The trick is to realize that our concept <hole> give us guidance to the nature of holes given various presuppositions about the nature of space.
	Here is where we think the lessons gleaned from consideration of the nature of holes begin to take shape in a way that is relevant to metaphysics more generally. Holes, like any other phenomena that are the fodder for metaphysical theorizing, are out there in the world. We think that the right process of developing a metaphysical account of the nature of holes is essentially the a priori process of discovering conceptual truths about holes. It is the process of discovering what is in our concept <hole>. But this is no straightforward matter. It is a matter of discovering what we would say about holes under starkly different suppositions about the nature of space. As we see it, the complex conceptual edifice that tells us what we should say about holes under these different suppositions exhausts all that can be said a priori about holes. What holes are, in the sense of what sort of entity they turn out to be, in different worlds, ultimately depends on which of these suppositions turn out to be genuinely possible and that issue might be resolved in part by further a priori reasoning and in part by information from the physical sciences. 

]a[5.5 Metaphysics and Analysis

]fo[With an understanding of the relationship between the metaphysics of holes and an account of the nature of space under our belts, we can now consider what to say about the correct analysis of <hole>. In the following analyses we will use the locution “holes are identical to X.” This can be read in one of two ways. It can be read in the straightforward way that implies no appeal to contingent identity and, where, if a hole is identical to X, then it is identical to X in every world in which it exists. As we noted earlier, there are serious problems that arise from embracing this conception. But there may be those who are willing to bite various bullets and declare that many of our intuitions about counterfactuals regarding holes are simply false. If so, then read in terms of straightforward identity our new analysis can be seen as a way of avoiding the more general error theory problem that arises once we consider the possibility that other accounts of the nature of space might be true. On the other hand, the locution “holes are identical to X” can be read as the claim that holes are contingently identical to X. This latter is our preferred reading, since only then will perfectly plausible counterfactuals about holes come out true. 
The following conditionals are plausible claims about holes. Let the topological and relational properties relevant to settling the location of holes be called the H-properties. Then:

]nl[1. If relationism (actualist or modal) is necessarily true, then, necessarily, holes are identical to the material beings that possess the H-properties if there are any, and to particular surfaces (hole-linings) of material beings otherwise.
2. If tensor field substantivalism is necessarily true, then holes are identical to the regions of tensor field substantival space that possess the H-properties and necessarily so. 
3. If metric field substantivalism is necessarily true, then holes are identical to the regions of metric field substantival space that possess the H-properties and necessarily so.
4. If manifold substantivalism is necessarily true, then holes are identical to the regions of manifold substantival space that possess the H-properties and necessarily so.

]fo[Claim (4) is worth some discussion. We could simply have said that if manifold substantivalism is necessarily true, then, necessarily, holes are identical to immaterial beings. For if manifold substantivalism is necessarily true, then every hole is identical to an immaterial, rather than a material, being. If manifold substantivalism is necessarily true, we might think, the immaterial beings view is vindicated. In a sense that is right: all holes will turn out to be immaterial beings. But we are not convinced that this is part of the analysis of <hole>. First, it is not clear why the conditional claim in (4) should have a quite different form from that in (2) and (3), given that nothing about the nature of manifold substantivalism itself or the concept <hole> seems to suggest any such difference. Rather, we think, we make a discovery once we see that manifold substantivalism is necessarily true: we discover that, in every world, what it is that realizes the role of being a hole is an immaterial being. The immaterial beings view would turn out to be right about the metaphysics of holes, but wrong as an analysis of the concept. 
Given these conditionals, there is nothing we can discover about the nature of space in a world that would make us eliminativists about holes in that world. Rather, when we discover which account of space holds, we discover what sort of entity the holes are. So the discovery that relationism is true and necessarily so is not, as the immaterial beings view would have it, the discovery that there are no holes. Rather, it is the discovery that, necessarily, occupied holes are material beings, and unoccupied holes are hole-linings. But that is consistent with holes being identical to regions of substantival space if it should turn out that space is substantival and necessarily so. 
We can collapse the four conditionals above into a more general, user-friendly necessitarian analysis. 

]ex[(NA) For any kind of substantivalism K, if all worlds are K worlds then holes are identical to regions of K-type substantival space that possess the H-properties and necessarily so, otherwise, necessarily, holes are identical to the material beings that possess the H-properties if there are any, and to hole-linings otherwise. 

]fo[It is then relatively easy to take into account the possibility (real or epistemic), that each of these accounts of the nature of space might turn out to be false – either necessarily or contingently – or turn out to be only contingently true. It seems we want to say that for any world with substantival space, whatever kind it might be, the holes in that world are identical to regions of that substantival space,​[17]​ and in worlds where relationism is true, if there are any material beings that have the H-properties, then the holes are identical to those material beings, otherwise they are identical to hole-linings. This yields the more complete analysis:

]ex[(CA1) For any world w, if w is a world with substantival space of kind K, then the holes in w are identical to regions of K-type substantival space that possess the H-properties, otherwise holes are identical to whichever material beings possess the H-properties if there are any, and otherwise to material hole-linings. 

]fo[(CA1) tells us that, in a relationist world where there are occupied holes, we conceptually prioritize material beings over hole-linings as being the referents of “hole.” Holes only turn out to be hole-linings if there is no entity whatever in the relevant region: any other entity is a better candidate. If it turns out that, necessarily, relationism is true, then it is necessarily false that holes are immaterial beings. But notice that, although it would be a necessary falsehood, it would not be a conceptual truth. For the conditional nature of the concept would remain, telling us that if we were to discover that in fact there is substantival space, matters would be otherwise. Likewise, if it turns out that substantivalism of one kind or another is true at every world, then it turns out to be a necessary falsehood that holes are hole-linings, though for parallel reasons its necessity would not be a conceptual matter (even though it follows from a conceptual analysis and a metaphysical discovery). Once again it would remain epistemically possible that relationism is true (perhaps even necessarily true) and, if true, that hole eliminativism would not be vindicated. 
As it stands, this analysis is not sensitive to facts about the nature of space in our world. It is essentially a functionalist account of holes. It tells us that holes are identical, in any world to whichever realizer has the H-properties in that world, if there is such a realizer, or else to a hole-lining. So “hole” is a non-rigid term that refers, in different worlds, to whatever possesses the H-properties, and hence to immaterial beings in some worlds and material beings in others. 
But sometimes a candidate extension for a term is a significantly better deserver than any other candidates, such that we want to give that candidate some sort of conceptual priority. We might think that, if actually our world is a certain way, then holes are a certain way and necessarily so. Or we might think that, if our world is not a certain way, then holes are not a certain way and necessarily so. To capture this sort of conceptual priority without the threat of eliminativism we need to conditionally rigidify. A term is conditionally rigid if, given some number of actual candidate extensions, for each candidate extension the term would rigidify on some but not other extensions, were they to be actual. So, for instance, we might hold that immaterial beings are such good deservers of “hole,” that only if actually there are no such beings should we accept that holes can be material beings or hole-linings. Thus we think that “hole” rigidly refers to immaterial beings if there are any, and to something else otherwise. If “hole” is conditionally rigid in some way, then what counts as a hole in any world is sensitive to facts about the nature of space in our world. 	
There are various different ways one might conditionally rigidify on ways our world could be, but two stand out as the more plausible options. The first (CA2), conceptually prioritizes as the referent of “hole” any entity that occupies the region where, pre-theoretically, we would say there is a hole. It tells us that, if actually there are such entities, then worlds in which such entities are absent are worlds where there are no holes, not worlds where holes are hole-linings. On the other hand, if it turns out that our world is one that lacks such entities, this is not the discovery that there are no holes, rather, it is the discovery that actually holes are hole-linings. For in that case the second clause of the conditional comes into force, telling us that, in any world, if there are any entities that possess the H-properties then they are the holes, otherwise holes are the hole-linings. 

]ex[(CA2) If actually there are entities that possess the H-properties, then necessarily, any hole is identical to an entity that possesses the H-properties, otherwise holes are identical to whichever entities possess the H-properties if there are any, or otherwise to hole-linings. 

]fo[The second option for conditional rigidification prioritizes substantival space as the best deserver of “hole.” There are variants on this kind of analysis that rigidify on the kind of substantival space that there is actually, so that in worlds with substantival space of a different kind, there are no holes. We think this implausible. So it is consistent with (CA3) that actually there is one kind of substantival space with which holes are contingently identical, and that counterfactual holes are contingently identical with some region of substantival space or another, but not necessarily with space of the same substantival kind. But, the analysis tells us, if actually there is no substantival space then holes both actually and counterfactually are the material beings if there are any, or hole-linings if there are not.

]ex[(CA3) If actually there is substantival space, then necessarily holes are identical to regions of substantival space with the H-properties, otherwise they are whatever entities have the H-properties if there are any, or else they are the hole-linings.
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^1	  Sometimes called the Canberra Plan. 
^2	 ]notes[ Platitudes in this sense need not be thought of as actual conscious beliefs, or sentences taken to be true, but rather something like dispositions to form judgments or behave in different ways in different circumstances.
^3	  If unrestricted composition is true, then it straightforwardly follows that all occupied regions are occupied by material beings, and hence it follows that there is a material being that occupies the region where we are tempted to say there is a hole. If restricted composition is true not every occupied region is occupied by a material being, but it is still plausible that the region in question is so occupied, given that we have strong intuitions that it is occupied by a single entity, namely a hole.
^4	  We use the term “occupied” rather than filled, to distinguish the cases where a hole is occupied from cases where we would say that a hole is filled – the latter are simply cases where what it is that occupies the region is of substantially the same kind as that surrounding the hole, and hence we are inclined to say that the hole has been filled. If actual space is all qualified, then every hole is occupied, though not every hole is filled (witness holes in the road, occupied, but not filled).
^5	  Casati and Varzi make this point (1994, 35). 
^6	  Henceforth for simplicity we will simply talk of objects and the relations that hold between them, but this should be read to include events. 
^7	  Teller (1991, 364) calls actualist relationism “narrow relationism.” 
^8	  I [SHOULD THIS BE WE?]  YES IT SHOULD follow Le Poidevin (2004) and Sklar (1985) in referring to this view as modal relationism. Teller (1991, 364) calls modal relationism “liberalised relationism.” 
^9	  Author (2)’s discussion of holes draws attention to the fact that there is good reason to suppose that in the actual world, every possible location is occupied – the actual world is a plenum. If that were so, then in the actual world actualist relationism and modal relationism would not come apart, insofar as they would countenance the very same locations. But given that we know that there are physically possible worlds where there is no plenum, we know that these two accounts will come apart.
^10	  Butterfield frames the discussion in terms of points.
^11	  We do not use metaphysical possibility here to indicate a special kind of possibility, but just to indicate that we are interested only in objects that exist in worlds that are like w insofar as (at least) modal relationism is true at them.
^12	  There is an issue about whether manifold substantivalists should think that space–time is identical to a manifold, and the manifold identical to a collection of continuous points, or whether we might think that space–time is composed of, or constituted by, a manifold. The former would be a strictly reductive account of space–time, the latter may not be. This is an interesting issue, but for our purposes the distinction will not matter. For ease of exposition, however, we will talk only about the simpler reductive view. 
^13	  The worry with such a view is that it is open to the hole argument, and hence fares no better in that respect than manifold substantivalism.
^14	  There are various ways of strengthening of weakening what is thought to be essential, for instance Healey (1995) recommends a view that has some features in common with metric essentialism but is more minimal. 
^15	  One way to think of tensor field substantivalism is as the view that space is ontologically basic, and what it is for there to exist objects and events within space is for that space to have particular properties at particular locations. 
^16	  Though notice that if tensor field substantivalism is true we cannot have the very same region of space failing to realize the same hole in virtue of not having the H-properties, since in order to be the same region of space it is guaranteed to have the same H-properties. So holes and regions of space only come apart in one direction: we can have the same hole realized by different space, but we cannot have the same space failing to realize the same hole.
^17	  So we don’t think, for instance, that any of the kinds of substantival space is such an overwhelmingly better candidate with which to identify holes, that if each kind of space is possible, then only regions of one kind of substantival space should be identified with holes. 
